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Pivoting to Progressivism
Justice Stephen J. Chadwick, the Washington Supreme Court, and
Change in Early 20th-Century Judicial Reasoning and Rhetoric
hugh spitzer

S

triking political changes marked the beginning of the
20th century in the United States, highlighted by the
progressive movement and elections that toppled Republicans from power in the House of Representatives in
1910 and gave Democrats control of both houses of Congress and the presidency in 1912. Washington State had its
share of political upheaval, reflecting key issues of the day:
women gained the right to vote in 1910; voters enacted the
initiative, referendum, and recall in 1912; and progressive
forces from both political parties pushed for child labor
laws, workplace safety legislation, food and drug regulation,
municipal home rule, direct election of U.S. senators, and
clean government in general.

role as the public changed its perspective on the responsibility of government in addressing social and economic challenges. One can get a fascinating perspective on the Progressive Era and changes in judicial reasoning and rhetoric by
focusing on a judge who served on the Washington Supreme
Court during the core period of progressivism in American
politics, Stephen J. Chadwick. Justice Chadwick, who sat on
that bench from 1908 through 1919, was in many respects
typical of his supreme court colleagues: educated, publicly
involved, and politically ambitious. What was distinctive
about Chadwick was the leading role he played on the court

Washington State courts were not immune from these
changes. The progressive movement’s leadership was educated and middle class, and Washington’s elected judges
shared a middle-class economic status and outlook.1 As
progressive proposals made their way into party platforms
and then into law, the Washington courts moved away from
issuing decisions that favored the private sector and discouraged government intervention, such as the United
States Supreme Court’s famous Lochner decision in 1905,
which overturned a New York statute setting a maximum
number of working hours for bakers.2 Instead, the state’s
supreme court acceded to more robust governmental regulation of businesses and working conditions, showed more
deference to reforms enacted by legislators, and made tort
law more plaintiff friendly. In doing so, the court candidly
recognized in judicial opinions that shifts in public attitudes were partly behind these doctrinal changes.
Others have documented the early 20th-century reform
movement in Washington’s state and federal elections and
in its legislature and local governments.3 However, little attention has been paid to the part played by the state’s judges
in upholding progressive legislation when courts in many
other states were overturning reform measures on constitutional theories that had gained dominance since the Civil
War. The Washington Supreme Court was willing to modify
both its legal doctrines and its position on the judiciary’s

Stephen J. Chadwick’s judicial opinions illustrate how judges
adjusted legal doctrines and their notions about the judiciary’s
role in response to social and political change during the
Progressive Era. (Earl Kennell, Gallagher Law Library, University of
Washington [UW] School of Law, Seattle)
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in conceptualizing and communicating that body’s changing stance on the legality of progressive legislation. Chadwick’s judicial opinions are striking for their cogent reasoning and clarity. They are also striking for their honesty about
the forces that were causing him, as a judge, to look at things
in a fresh way, anticipating the legal realist approach to legal
theory and judicial decision making that gained traction
nationally in the 1920s and 1930s.
During his dozen years on the bench, Chadwick authored
Washington Supreme Court opinions upholding limits on
working hours for women,4 local government control of
street-use franchises,5 the state’s right to regulate utility
rates and to enforce quarantines for public health,6 workers’
compensation and the workplace safety system,7 the consumer’s right to directly sue food processors,8 the public’s
referendum rights,9 and an absolute ban on public funds for
religious education.10 Justice Chadwick was no radical. He
was not even much of a reformer. Yet, as an author of opinions, he was a superb communicator who pulled the curtain
to reveal that legal doctrine was not static and that courts
were unavoidably affected by public demands, mostly for
stronger exercise of government regulatory power to rein in
corporate activities viewed as harmful. Although some contend that late 20th-century judges were overly activist in
their civil rights and civil liberties rulings, courts are rarely
very far ahead of public opinion on political and social matters. Like many other Progressive Era judicial bodies, the
Washington Supreme Court was a reactive player on the
state’s political scene. But Justice Chadwick’s candor in his
decisions demonstrates how courts, and legal doctrines, do
respond to significant shifts in political and economic
paradigms.

E

xamining the progressive movement’s agenda and its
influence on state law is critical to understanding the
pivotal role of Chadwick’s opinions on the Washington Supreme Court. The goals of that early 20th-century movement were, in the words of one of its proponents, “removing
corrupt, special influence from government; modifying the
structure of government so as to make it easier for the people to control; and using the government so restored to the
people to relieve social and economic distress.”11 Those
goals were carried out nationwide by progressives—both
Republicans and Democrats—who enacted reforms to protect workers and consumers, clean up government, and increase the political power of ordinary people.12 Progressives
were generally skeptical of the political parties, which they
saw as fundamentally corrupt. At the national level, progressive members of both parties united to push a substantial legislative program through Congress.13 Part of the progressive movement’s platform aimed at loosening the
political parties’ grip on the political system, and in Washington State this led to the implementation of nonpartisan
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ballots for local elections and judgeships—a change that assisted Chadwick’s election to the Washington Supreme
Court in 1908.14
Washington State was at the forefront of the progressive
movement, with adherents in both parties collaborating to
enact many reforms:15 a railway commission in 1905;16 direct primaries and nonpartisan judicial elections in 1907;17
nonpartisan judicial elections again in 1909, after the earlier
measure had been rescinded by Republican legislators worried about Chadwick’s 1908 election;18 nonpartisan local
elections in 1909;19 woman suffrage in 1910;20 the initiative,
referendum, and recall,21 workers’ compensation,22 and an
eight-hour day for women23 in 1911; and approval of a federal constitutional amendment providing for popular election of U.S. senators nationwide in 1913.24 All of this was
made possible by the 1910 election, which sent the progressive candidate Miles Poindexter to the U.S. Senate and a majority legislative coalition of progressive Republicans and
Democrats to the state legislature.25 Though the reformers’
domination of the Washington State Legislature was short
lived—lasting only through the 1914 election—most of the
progressives’ legislation remains in effect today.26
The progressive drive for reform is generally seen as a movement for clean government and fair play, driven by those in
the skilled trades and the middle class, in an economic system that had become dominated by large corporations and
trusts.27 The core actors in the movement were mostly
white, Protestant, educated professionals, small-business
owners, and craftspeople whose interests and values were
threatened both by the large corporations and by the lowincome immigrants whom they viewed as susceptible to assorted vices and political corruption.28 William T. Kerr, Jr.,
has carefully documented the political and occupational
backgrounds of the progressive Democrats and Republicans
who controlled the 1910 Washington State Legislature,
showing them to be relatively young, well educated, nativeborn, and “more often than not . . . lawyers, independent
business and professional men, or relatively prosperous
farmers.”29 Kerr has observed that the state’s progressive
leaders, including the legislative majority who enacted the
progressive program in Washington, “came from the element in society which is traditionally identified as the
American middle class.”30 Nevertheless, in contrast with the
earlier populist movement, progressivism was driven by urbanites. Kerr made two intriguing observations: First,
Washington progressives in either party tended to come
from five urban-industrial counties or from wealthy wheatproducing counties in eastern Washington (including
Chadwick’s Whitman County). In contrast, conservative
candidates were elected from poorer rural areas in western
and central Washington.31 Second, although Republicans
were a majority in the legislature, that party was divided
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rather evenly between progressives and conservatives, while
the Democrats were “highly progressive in their views.” Kerr
concluded, “While the average progressive reformer was
likely to be a Republican, the average Democrat was likely to
be a progressive reformer.”32

eastern Washington’s Whitman County. There he opened a
law office with his close boyhood friend and fellow Oregonian Mark Fullerton, a Republican who was elected to the
Washington Supreme Court in 1898 and who served
throughout the time that Chadwick was on the court.41

Various commentators later blamed the middle-class character of early 20th-century progressivism for what they
saw as the movement’s failure to bring about fundamental
changes in the distribution of political power and economic wealth in the country.33 But from a practical standpoint, the movement did bring a number of real changes
to the political process and enacted legislation that made a
difference to working people. Further, the fact that Washington State Democrats, urban dwellers, and eastern
Washington farmers were favorably disposed to progressive proposals suggests that the people with whom Stephen Chadwick had lived and worked would have supported these approaches; he did not go very far out on a
limb socially or professionally by a positive judicial handling of progressive legislation.

Chadwick was an active member of his new community,
serving as mayor of Colfax from 1891 to 1893 and as a state
land commissioner from 1894 to 1897. Chadwick’s law
practice in Colfax appears to have flourished. He was highly
regarded as a young lawyer and considered the peer of respected attorneys with many more years in practice. In
1900, soon after his friend Mark Fullerton left to join the
Washington Supreme Court, Chadwick was voted onto the
Whitman County Superior Court bench, defeating a Populist elected four years earlier.42 Chadwick was reelected in
1904 with broad political support.43 Both as a lawyer and as
a judge, Chadwick had many Republican friends, a fact that
might have harmed his later career.44

E

arly 20th-century jurists in Washington State tended to
be experienced in and attuned to political life. Chadwick and 12 of the 16 individuals he served with during his
years on the supreme court had held nonjudicial elective office prior to being elected to that court—acting as prosecuting attorneys, city council members, or state legislators.34
Chadwick and 10 of his colleagues had prior experience as
trial court judges.35 When a short hiatus in partisan judicial
elections gave Chadwick a good shot at a state supreme
court seat in 1908, he became the only Democrat serving on
that bench. He was eventually joined by five more justices
who identified themselves as Democrats.36
Chadwick had public service in his blood. He was born in
Roseburg, Oregon, the son of a politically active lawyer father and a mother whose own father had been a judge.
Chadwick’s father was a Democrat who served as a postmaster, judge, constitutional convention delegate, presidential elector, Oregon secretary of state, and, finally, governor.37 When his father gained statewide office, young
Stephen moved to Salem, later recalling: “My father seems
to have made it a point to introduce me to men, so that it
was my privilege to know all of the men who had been governor of the State of Oregon . . . and all the judges and a
great many of the prominent men in professional and business life.”38 Both before and during his life in Salem, Chadwick received a thorough classical education, later remarking upon the large number of pioneers who were “well read
in the classics and in good literature.”39 Chadwick attended
Willamette University, worked as a journalist and editor,
and studied law at the University of Oregon prior to passing
the bar in 1885.40 He then moved north, settling in Colfax in

In 1908, Chadwick was discussed as a gubernatorial possibility, but instead he ran for the Washington Supreme
Court.45 Despite his identification with the Democratic
Party, he had a fighting chance in a predominantly Republican state because a movement for nonpartisan elections had
caused the legislature to discontinue party nominations for
judicial positions. Notwithstanding his experience in partisan politics, Chadwick was studiously nonpartisan and
nonpolitical in his campaign, a sensible approach for a candidate known as a Democrat.46 Chadwick received the largest number of votes, with the incumbents Herman Crow
and Milo Root winning the other slots.47 After Chadwick’s
election, but before his term began, Governor Albert Mead,
a Republican, appointed him to the position that the recently reelected Justice Root had just resigned because of a
conflict-of-interest scandal.48 Thus, Chadwick served for
several weeks on the court prior to January 1909, when he
took the position to which he had been elected.
Even during his decade of service on the court, Chadwick
continued to eye other elective offices and still more prestigious judgeships. In August 1910, the Pullman Herald reported that Chadwick was “being urged by some of his
Olympia friends to file his declaration of candidacy as democratic candidate for United States senator” in the elections
later that year.49 But Chadwick stuck to his court responsibilities while looking for other ways to enhance his career.
After Woodrow Wilson’s election in 1912, Chadwick actively sought appointment to the Federal District Court for
Eastern Washington, and in 1913 the U.S. attorney general,
James Clark McReynolds, recommended him for the position to the president. But opposition arose from Democrats
who did not see Chadwick as partisan enough, from progressives who saw him as too conservative, and from Miles
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After passing the bar exam in Oregon in 1885, a young, mustachioed Chadwick (front row center, first from the left) moved to Colfax,
Washington, where he quickly became an active member of the community. He is pictured here in 1896 with other members of the Walla
Walla and Colfax bars. (Whitman County Historical Society)

Poindexter, whose support would be necessary to get the
nomination through the Senate. But there appeared to be
no love lost between Chadwick and Poindexter, and the latter played a key role in blocking the appointment.50 Two
years later, the Seattle Times reported that Chadwick was
challenging Poindexter in 1916 because he believed “that
Poindexter was responsible for President Woodrow Wilson’s
. . . rejecting his name as a candidate for federal court judge.”
The paper added, “Chadwick and his friends will leave nothing undone to defeat Poindexter.”51

he wished to make possible years ago when ambition
spurred him to be a Democratic nominee for either governor or United States senator, but which circumstances always combined to prevent.” If “Chadwick could be induced
to run as a Democratic nominee for senator,” the article
noted, “he would be an unusually strong candidate. In his
judicial campaigns he has polled a majority vote,” this “despite the fact that he has ignored popular clamor and
handed down his decisions in accordance with his own
views and often at variance with public opinion.”54

In the meantime, however, Chadwick continued his work
on the state supreme court. He ran successfully for another
term in 1914, winning the highest number of votes statewide in both the primary and the general election despite
opposition from the Left.52 An advertisement in the leftleaning Seattle Star, for example, labeled Chadwick a judge
for “the reactionary forces.”53 But his broader political interests continued. When he resigned from the court in 1919
after serving nearly two terms, the Seattle Times observed,
“Judge Chadwick finally is free from the bench, something

After leaving the court, Chadwick joined the prestigious Seattle firm Hughes, McMicken, Ramsey and Rupp. Despite
talk of a senatorial candidacy in 1920, and again in 1924, he
focused on what turned out to be a successful practice in
corporate law and probate, was president of the state bar
association and state grand master of the Masons of Washington in 1924, and was active in various other legal and
community groups.55 A contemporary handbook of practicing attorneys described him as “having a complete knowledge of evidence” and as “a forceful speaker and tireless
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worker.”56 In 1928, at age 65, he finally threw his hat into the
ring for governor. It was a rough campaign. Supporters of
the well-funded Scott Bullitt, Chadwick’s main competitor
in the Democratic primary, attacked the former jurist for
being too old to campaign vigorously, a weak Democrat,
and a corporate lawyer and claimed that he was opposed by
labor.57 Bullitt vastly outspent his opponent and gained the
nomination, only to fall in the general election to Roland
Hartley, the conservative Republican incumbent.58
When Chadwick died suddenly three years later, he was eulogized as “a lawyer of the old school, with all of its traditions and ideals” and said to have been held “in high esteem
because of [his] sterling public character of honesty, loyalty
and service to his state.”59 Several commentators remarked
that it was unfortunate that the state of Washington had not
had the opportunity to benefit from Chadwick serving in
the governor’s mansion.60 Little mention was made of his
rulings during his tenure on the state supreme court. But
those judicial decisions, because of their impact on the
court’s approach to the constitutionality of social legislation
and government regulation in the state of Washington,
turned out to be his lasting legacy.

W

hen Chadwick joined the Washington Supreme
Court in 1908, he entered a body that had blocked a
number of statutes aimed at regulating business, protecting
consumers, and improving industrial working conditions.
At the federal and often the state level, legal reasoning had
gradually become dominated since the Civil War by an approach that was later categorized by (mostly critical) commentators as “formalist,” “legalistic,” “classical,” and “orthodox.” Regardless of the description, this approach asserted
that law, ideally, was neutral and could be applied in a more
or less mechanical way.61 Although jurists in this school of
thought recognized that law reflected and responded to social and economic forces, they believed that judicial response to changing social conditions should be slow and
measured.62 For example, in Holden v. Hardy, a case upholding Utah’s statute limiting working hours in the mining industry, Justice Henry Brown noted that “this court has not
failed to recognize the fact that the law is, to a certain extent,
a progressive science”63 and that it is “forced to adapt itself
to new conditions of society, and particularly to the new relations between employers and employees, as they arise.”64
Howard Gillman has carefully documented how the classical legal approach was based on an ideal of equality from an
earlier and simpler America, a concept that laws should not
be manipulated to favor one “class” (interest group) or another, but rather should serve the public generally and apply
equally to all classes of citizens.65 This concept of equality is
implicit in many of the state privileges and immunities
clauses embedded in 19th-century constitutions, including
Washington’s.66 America’s leading constitutional academics

were idealists whose treatises built upon the classical liberal
economic theories of the late 19th century. They developed
equal protection and substantive due process doctrines under the Fourteenth Amendment, which courts then used to
overturn regulations aimed at the business sector on the
grounds that they tipped the scale on behalf of one class
(such as employees) and that they interfered with personal
liberty and property rights.67
Orthodox courts also shaped tort law to counteract what
judges viewed as dangerous redistributions of wealth from
rich to poor.68 When Congress and state legislatures responded to public pressure for action against interest groups
such as monopolistic trusts, sought to control rapaciously
high rates charged for critical transportation or utility services, or to regulate industrial hours and wage rates, the judiciary often (though not always) came down on the side of
the corporations.69 The judge (and later, the professor)
John F. Dillon, the foremost late 19th-century authority on
municipal law and government police power, saw many regulatory statutes as socialist threats and many taxes as illicit
efforts to redistribute wealth; he urged courts to vigilantly
guard against “class legislation” that would endanger capitalism and the nation’s economic development.70 Another
bête noire was social legislation that endangered individual
liberties and, most important, the liberty of contract between employers and employees (that is, the freedom of individual workers and bosses to contract in any way they saw
fit, free of government regulation). These views were promoted by many leading academics and judges, most notably
the U.S. Supreme Court justices Stephen Field and Rufus
Peckham, and gained momentum as the 19th century came
to a close.71�
Building on the legal treatises of Dillon, Thomas M. Cooley,
and Christopher G. Tiedeman, many state courts, and subsequently the U.S. Supreme Court, adopted legal doctrines
that constrained the ability of Congress and legislatures to
regulate and tax business and to enact laws protecting workers.72 Notable cases at the national level included United
States v. E. C. Knight Co., blocking the federal government
from using the Sherman Antitrust Act to regulate a massive
sugar monopoly on the grounds that the manufacturing of
sugar did not sufficiently implicate interstate commerce;73
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company, ruling a federal
income tax unconstitutional;74 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, striking down a state law regulating marine insurance companies;75 the aforementioned Lochner v. New York; Hammer v.
Dagenhart, ruling that a child labor law regulated industrial
production, not interstate commerce, and therefore was
outside Congress’s authority;76 and Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, overturning a congressional act guaranteeing a minimum wage for women and children in the District of Columbia.77 Notwithstanding the attempted neutrality in
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judicial decision making, the results were often, though not
always, antiworker.78 Though Supreme Court appointments
by Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson
adjusted the composition of that bench and led to closer
court votes in these types of cases, U.S. Supreme Court decisions continued to be shaped by the orthodox laissez-faire
approach into the late 1930s. But the states by no means followed the U.S. Supreme Court in a lockstep fashion. The
Supreme Court had lagged behind the states in adopting
liberty of contract and related doctrines, and as the progressive movement gained strength in the early 20th century,
the Supreme Court again lagged behind a number of states
in moving away from the laissez-faire approach. Washington became one of the states rejecting, in the words of the
scholar Claudio J. Katz, “due process challenges . . . with increasing frequency and confidence.”79

I

n the first years of the 20th century, Washington’s high
court had followed the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court,
and, like many other state courts, it was influenced by probusiness legal orthodoxy. One case in which this tendency
was clear was 1904’s State ex rel. Aubrey, in which the court
overturned a state law requiring every horseshoer to obtain
a license by passing a test administered by a veterinarian
and experienced practitioners.80 In its opinion, the court
quoted with admiration Justice Field’s classic dissent outlining substantive due process theory in the 1872 Slaughterhouse Cases (which involved New Orleans’s regulation of
the butcher trade): “All sorts of restrictions and burdens are
imposed under it [the police power]. . . . But under the pretense of prescribing a police regulation the state cannot be
permitted to encroach upon any of the just rights of the citizen, which the Constitution intended to secure against
abridgment.”81 Washington’s Aubrey opinion continued:
“Liberty” in its broad sense, as understood in this country, means the
right not only of freedom from actual servitude, imprisonment, or
restraint, but the right of one to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to
live and work when he will, to earn his livelihood in any lawful
calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or avocation. All laws,
therefore, which impair or trammel these rights—which limit him in
his choice of a trade or profession—are infringements upon his
fundamental rights of liberty, which are under constitutional
protection.82

The following year, in State v. Brown, the Washington Supreme Court unanimously held that though the state could
regulate dentistry in the interest of public health, it was beyond the scope of its police power to regulate the ownership
and management of a dental office.83 In his opinion, Justice
Milo Root liberally quoted from Justice Field’s opinion in
Lawton v. Steele.84 Root declared, “To own and manage
property is a natural right, and one which may be restricted
only for reasons of public policy, clearly discernible. To hold
this portion of the statute valid would be to make possible
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conditions which were never designed to exist.”85 In 1906,
the court in State ex rel. Richey v. Smith overturned a recent
law requiring a license to work as a plumber.86 The unanimous opinion authored by Justice Frank Rudkin quoted
from the U.S. Supreme Court justice Rufus Peckham’s dissent in a similar plumber licensing case:
The trade of the practical plumber is not one of the learned
professions, nor does such a tradesman hold himself out in any
manner as an expert in the science of “sanitation,” nor is any such
knowledge expected of him, and this act, when practically enforced,
may or may not exact it of him.87

Rudkin’s opinion also mentioned the U.S. Supreme Court’s
recent Lochner decision and quoted Justice Peckham’s statement that there “must be more than the mere . . . existence
of some small amount of unhealthiness to warrant legislative interference with liberty.”88
But a 1907 opinion written by Chadwick’s friend Mark Fullerton hinted at changes to come. In his opinion in Shortall
v. Puget Sound Bridge and Dredging Co., Fullerton upheld a
statute requiring that wages be paid in cash or the equivalent.89 Justice Root concurred but declined to sign the opinion. The following year, in 1908, Root resigned in a scandal
centered on his personal ties to the Great Northern Railway
Company, a litigant before the court.90 Chadwick, who had
just been elected to a vacant seat, was appointed to finish
Root’s term. Chadwick’s election to a now nonpartisan position in a year when the progressive movement was building steam signaled that a change in judicial attitude and
methodology was about to occur.
Chadwick’s first reported opinion on the extent of government regulatory authority did not appear to diverge from
the classical approach. In Puget Sound Warehouse Co. v.
Northern Pacific Railway Co., he wrote on behalf of a unanimous panel that the state did not have the authority to inspect, or to charge an inspection fee for, a commodity that
was not intended for immediate sale to the public.91 “That
the state has a right to pass inspection laws,” wrote Chadwick, “cannot be doubted, but in all such cases the power
must be referable, in some degree, at least, to some recognized subject of police control.”92 He stressed that “there
must be some abuse in the suppression of which the public
is interested” and pointed out that in previous cases upholding grain inspection statutes, the public “had a direct
and positive interest to protect the community from frauds
and impositions in food products or from false weights and
measures.” But in this instance, he wrote, “We cannot assume that an owner who ships and consigns his grain to
himself needs any protection, or will be guilty of a fraud
against himself.”93 Though his decision circumscribing governmental police power appears in line with earlier orthodox opinions, Chadwick’s ready recognition of the legiti-
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In 1912, State v. Somerville
upheld a statute mandating
an eight-hour workday
for women, but, to Justice
Chadwick’s chagrin, women
working in canneries, such as
these women in Wahkiakum
County, had been excluded
from the legislation. (Oregon
Historical Society, Portland,
OrHi 56468)

macy of consumer protection laws suggests that he was not
altogether opposed to government regulations.

J

ust two years later, after the 1910 election had swept an
activist progressive majority into the state legislature,
Chadwick authored an important opinion upholding the
Public Utilities Act of 1911 and the power of the newly created Public Service Commission to control telephone
rates.94 Speaking for a majority of seven to two, Chadwick
explicitly recognized that changing social and economic
conditions could affect how the judiciary approached questions of the appropriateness of governmental power.
The police power of the state is more than an attribute of sovereignty. It, like the power of taxation, is an essential element of
government, and exists in every state without express declaration
and without limitation, in so far as it is made to apply to the health,
peace, comfort, and morals of the people. Formerly applied strictly
and directly, it has now, because of changed economic conditions,
come to be more favored, and is frequently relied upon to sustain
laws which but indirectly affect the common good.95

The last sentence encapsulates the changing view of the
proper application of the state’s police power. The classical
doctrine had emphasized that government regulations were
legitimate only if they protected the public at large, as fire
safety laws did, for example. But many judges, including
Chadwick and his colleagues, were coming to see that some
regulations, such as those governing utilities, could broadly
benefit the public and should not be regarded as class legis-

lation shifting resources from the rich to the poor. As to the
telephone companies’ “freedom” to set rates as they chose,
Chadwick quoted from two recent decisions, one upholding
the right of local governments to control franchises for the
use of public streets and the other upholding aspects of a
recently enacted workers’ compensation law.96 “There is no
absolute right to do as one wills, pursue any calling one desires, or contract as one chooses . . . liberty means absence of
arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community.”97 Police power, “in its broadest acceptation . . . means
the general power of the state to preserve and promote the
public welfare, even at the expense of private rights.”98
Two months later, in State v. Somerville, a five-justice panel
including Chadwick upheld a new state law that imposed an
eight-hour limit on working hours for women in a broad
range of industries.99 In the lead opinion, Justice Herman
Crow, a Republican popular with both parties and known
for his support of reform legislation, based his ruling in part
on Muller v. Oregon, a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision
upholding an Oregon statute restricting women’s working
hours.100 Justice Chadwick added a concurrence, arguing
not only that the law was constitutional but that the legislature’s exclusion of women cannery workers from the act’s
protections did not have a rational basis and could not be
supported.101
Chadwick’s most candid expression of the effect of chang-

Summer 2013

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2423649

113

ing political and social dynamics on judicial decisions came
the following year in State v. Mountain Timber Co., the second challenge mounted against a workers’ compensation
law enacted by the progressive legislature.102 The plaintiff
had asserted that the statute violated, among other things,
the Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable searches and
seizures, the Seventh Amendment jury trial rights, the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment due process protections, and
the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantees. In
his decision upholding the state’s collection of industrial insurance premiums from a logging company, Chadwick
quoted from several other court decisions upholding the
government’s strong regulatory (“police”) powers. These
included Noble State Bank v. Haskell, in which Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote “that the police power extends to all the
great public needs,”103 and State v. Somerville, in which
Washington’s Justice Crow declared,
Circumstances and occasions calling for . . . exercise [of the police
power] have multiplied with marvelous rapidity in recent years, by
reason of the well-recognized fact that modern, social and economic
conditions have called into existence agencies previously unknown;
many of which so vitally affect the health and physical condition of
laborers, and especially female laborers, that legislation of the
character here involved has been sustained with greater liberality
than was formerly evinced under less exacting conditions.104

Chadwick then expanded upon Justice Crow’s statement:
From the peace of the community and the suppression of nuisances,
we have undertaken to regulate things hitherto considered private.
To illustrate: We have held that the Legislature may enact laws for the
promotion of health; provide for the marketing of food products;

prevent fraud in the disposition and sale of goods; prevent the doing
of certain work and the pursuit of certain occupations upon the
Sabbath day; regulate certain trades, businesses and professions;
limit the hours of labor upon public works, and fix hours of labor
for women; enact drainage laws and fill lowlands where drainage is
impractical. These are a part, only, of the subjects touching private
affairs treated under the police power and sustained as needful and
proper regulations. . . .
. . . The police power is to the public what the law of necessity is to
the individual. It is comprehended in the maxim, Salus populi
suprema lex. It is not a rule; it is an evolution.105

Chadwick also gave a nod to the analysis of Justice Holmes
in another police power case and added:
The scope of the police power is to be measured by the legislative
will of the people upon questions of public concern, not in acts
passed in response to sporadic impulses or exuberant displays of
emotion, but in those enacted in affirmance of established usage or
of such standards of morality and expediency as have by gradual
processes and accepted reason become so fixed as to fairly indicate
the better will of the people in their social, industrial and political
development.106

Justice Chadwick’s language in Mountain Timber eloquently
expresses the marked change in the judiciary’s approach to
regulatory actions by the legislature and the increased willingness of the court to defer to statutes passed by elected
lawmakers, enactments that a half-dozen years earlier would
have been struck down as they had been in State ex rel. Aubrey, State v. Brown, and State ex rel. Richey v. Smith. Mountain Timber was appealed all the way to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which in a six-to-three decision upheld Chadwick’s
decision and in doing so illustrated that during this period
Workers in hazardous
industries like logging were
protected under the legislation
upheld in State v. Mountain
Timber in 1913. (Special
Collections, UW Libraries,
Pickett 1584)
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the nation’s high court did not strike down every piece of
progressive legislation that came before it.107
Still another Chadwick opinion that exemplifies the change
in the Washington court’s move away from the classical approach is Mazetti v. Armour and Co., issued two days after
Mountain Timber.108 The plaintiffs, restaurateurs, had purchased a carton of cooked tongue from the defendant, Armour and Company, a meat packer. The restaurant had
served the tongue to a patron, not knowing that “in the center of the carton was a foul, filthy, nauseating, and poisonous substance.”109 The court ruled that a meat packer could
be held liable for injuries to a consumer despite the lack of
a direct contractual relationship between the two parties.
Chadwick noted the traditional doctrine, “that a manufacturer is not liable to any person other than his immediate
vendee; that the action is necessarily one upon an implied
or express warranty, and that without privity of contract no
suit can be maintained; that each purchaser must resort to
his immediate vendor.”110 That common law, or judgemade, theory had been developed and carefully articulated
during the prior decades in a manner that shielded manufacturers from most consumer lawsuits and supported the
expansion of American industry. Privity of contract (the
doctrine providing that a contract vests rights only in the
direct parties) and protection of business from runaway
tort claims were at the core of late 19th-century orthodox
jurisprudence.111
But Chadwick swept that all aside in a unanimous opinion.
“The boast of the common law,” wrote Chadwick, was “that
it was able to adjust itself to the inevitable vicissitudes and
changes that occur in the development of human affairs.”112
He then quoted from a Maine Supreme Judicial Court opinion from the year before: “The principles of the common
law have adapted themselves so aptly as to render almost
imperceptible the radical transitions that have taken
place.”113 Chadwick ruled that because industrial processes
made it impossible for a retailer to determine the quality of
the products hidden within packaging, it made no sense to
force the consumer to sue the storeowner rather than the
manufacturer. Instead, an action against the meat packer, by
either the merchant or purchaser, or both, was the proper
approach.114 Chadwick remarked that this case, “in so far as
the dealer is permitted to sue the manufacturer,” is “one of
first impression. We think the complaint states a cause of
action. If there is no authority for the remedy, it is high time
for such an authority.”115
The Washington court’s ruling in Mazetti v. Armour and Co.
predated by three years a much more famous decision by
the New York State Court of Appeals justice Benjamin Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick, and Chadwick’s opinion in
Mazetti was much more explicit than Cardozo’s that the

court was actively updating doctrine in response to modern
manufacturing and distribution processes.116 But both cases
directly reflected the progressive movement’s concern for
consumers and, more important, the judiciary’s increasing
deference to legislatures and decreasing willingness to place
constitutional roadblocks in the way of broadly supported
reforms.117

C

hadwick authored more of the key Washington Supreme Court opinions upholding progressive legislation than any of his colleagues. It is not clear why he was the
most frequent writer of these rulings, but one likely factor is
that, as a former journalist, he was a superb writer, and his
colleagues respected and signed on to his concise, carefully
structured, and lucid opinions that could be readily understood both by lawyers and by the general public.118
Chadwick and the Washington Supreme Court did not always come down on the side of industrial workers, consumers, or others favored by progressivism. For example, in Ross
v. Erickson Const. Co., he wrote an opinion holding that the
workers’ compensation system, while providing guaranteed
payouts to injured workers, simultaneously placed monetary limits and procedural restrictions on recoveries by persons injured on the job. Therefore, employees lost their
right to sue an employer or a physician engaged by an employer.119 Chadwick also frequently recognized the strong
rights of property owners,120 warned of the dangers of class
conflict,121 and cautioned against both oversized government122 and overtaxation.123 His independence likely had an
adverse effect on his later campaign for governor. But on the
whole, his judicial opinions reflected a consistent support
for legislation enacting progressive proposals, and he was
typically joined in his opinions by a solid majority of his
colleagues.
A cynic might suggest that the Washington Supreme
Court justices changed their tune on regulatory and social
legislation in the years 1910-13 to preserve their elective positions. Progressives swept state elections in 1910 and national elections in 1912. The recent shift to nonpartisan judicial positions removed the assurance of reelection for
Republican-backed justices in a solidly Republican state because their party label was no longer on the ballot. Thus, the
cynic might argue, the high court curtailed its practice of
overturning popular legislation to avoid facing a hostile
electorate. In the instance of Chadwick, it also could be asserted that, notwithstanding his independent spirit, his political ambitions prompted him to act in a manner calculated to increase his popularity with voters. But the
motivations of appellate courts are much more subtle than
that. Relatively few incumbent Washington Supreme Court
justices have lost their positions, and even fewer of those
turnovers have resulted from unpopular decisions in high-
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profile judicial opinions. More often, a justice’s loss of office
is the result of personal foibles or lackluster campaigns.124
Chadwick’s independent streak led him to take some unpopular positions, yet he was reelected to the court in 1914
with the highest number of votes among all the state judicial candidates.125 Further, appointed state justices with permanent tenure—such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., while
on the Massachusetts court—also began to approach legal
issues in ways that were consistent with broad shifts in public attitudes; because these officials were not elected for office, their change in views could not have reflected a desire
to curry favor with voters.
There are at least three related explanations for the Washington Supreme Court’s rapid change in direction during
the Progressive Era. First, the justices were sophisticated,
pragmatic, and politically experienced leaders who were
rooted in their communities. Chadwick was not altogether
atypical of his colleagues. He was a capable careerist who
continually looked for ways to improve his reputation in

public service, as did the people with whom he served on
the bench. Chadwick and the other justices previously had
been local elected officials, and they continued to participate in social clubs, fraternal societies, and churches. Many
were involved in Masonic orders, and, as mentioned before,
Chadwick eventually became the state grand master. He was
also an active member of the Ancient Order of United
Workmen, the College Club of Seattle, the state bar association, and various other social, professional, and civic organizations. Though, as Gillman has observed, when writing
legal opinions, judges “may be motivated by a set of interests and concerns that are relatively distinct from the preferences of particular social groups” or their own “social and
political loyalties and sympathies,” as a person entrenched
in his community—first in Whitman County, and later in
Olympia and Seattle—Chadwick could not have avoided
being affected by the call for government to address industrial conditions, class and labor tensions, public health
problems, and what many viewed as corporate exploitation
of both workers and consumers.126

During the years 1910-13, the Washington Supreme Court was greatly influenced by the progressive movement. Chadwick is seated
second from left, and his former law partner Mark Fullerton is standing at left. Herman Crow, lead author in State v. Somerville, is
standing third from left. (Susan Parish Photograph Collection, 1889-1990, Digital Archives, Washington State Archives, Olympia)
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Second, like other middle-class Washingtonians, the state’s
judges were becoming increasingly comfortable with the
concept of government intervention in the social and economic spheres as an antidote to the less desirable consequences of capitalism and rapid economic growth. Stephen
Chadwick was not radical. As a political candidate, he consistently expressed moderate views; indeed, his appointment to the federal bench and his later attempt at the governorship were both opposed by some progressive elements.
Although he was a Democrat, he counted many Republicans among his friends, including his close friend and former law partner Mark Fullerton. Both his court opinions
and his public speeches on current topics reflected a strong
belief in private property rights. But, in the highly politicized world of early 20th-century America, middle-class attitudes about the appropriate role of the government in
regulating the economy and social conditions had rapidly
changed.127 As that basic paradigm shifted, lawyers and
judges became part of that change. Specifically, many legal
professionals came to reject the idea that employers and
employees had anything even close to balanced bargaining
power. The justices gradually recognized that judicial insistence on a “neutral” liberty of contract doctrine unavoidably would result in judgments favoring business.128

never to overrule its decisions.”132 So, if there was anything
atypical about Justice Stephen Chadwick, it was his willingness to openly admit that adjustments in judge-made law
were driven by changing public attitudes and values. That
openness was a sign of a developing change in legal theory,
one that would ripen into the 20th-century legal realist
movement that focused on how judges really make decisions, regardless of the formal legal doctrines they
espoused.

Even Thomas M. Cooley, a leading liberty of contract theoretician, adjusted his views. Cooley evolved into a critic of
the federal courts’ application of the doctrines he had espoused in his constitutional law treatise and then accepted
an appointment as chair of the Interstate Commerce Commission, a key national regulatory body.129 Gillman has suggested that the “battle between the so-called progressive
movement and its conservative opponents represented an
intraclass debate about the future of American politics” and
that “the divisions separating participants in these debates
should not be overstated.”130 Similarly, Nancy Cohen has
mapped the intergenerational conflict between upper-middle-class liberal economists who came of age just after the
Civil War and the next generation of economists, who espoused doctrines of governmental interventionism—all
leading to a blending of ideas into the theoretical bases of
progressivism.131 Whatever the intellectual roots of the progressive movement, the real changes are undeniable. Nationwide, legislatures (including Washington’s) enacted
statutes that significantly increased state government protections for consumers, employees, and many others. Chadwick’s opinions upholding that legislation represented a
corresponding change in outlook, in outcomes, and in legal
rhetoric.

This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of
the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed
with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before
making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty,
because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has
nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions
in law. . . . Some of these laws embody convictions or prejudices
which judges are likely to share. Some may not. But a constitution is
not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of
laissez faire.135

Common law courts strive to maintain an appearance of solidity and continuity in doctrine. The legal scholar Roscoe
Pound once remarked that when the British House of Lords
used to serve as an appellate judicial body, it “purport[ed]

The third reason for the Washington Supreme Court’s new
approach can be tied directly to the influence of the writings
of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries. In his widely read and influential academic writings such as The Common Law and “The Path of the Law,”
Holmes eloquently argued that common law was driven by
history, by public values, by experience, and by policy
choices.133 In his judicial opinions, Holmes was candid,
combative, and open about his views of the role of the
courts and the need for the judiciary to defer to elected lawmakers on policy matters. Holmes was skeptical that the
courts could be truly neutral when they weighed in to block
policy choices between competing interests.134 For example,
in his famous dissenting opinion in Lochner, Holmes said:

N

otwithstanding the legal realists’ argument for judicial
transparency, Judge Richard Posner and two coauthors
recently observed that “most judicial opinions are legalistic
in style. They cite prior decisions as if those decisions really
were binding, parade reasoning by analogy, appear to give
great weight to statutory and constitutional language, delve
into history for clues to original meaning and so forth.” But
those commentators also point out that the most famous
and respected jurists, such as Holmes, Benjamin Cardozo,
John Marshall, Louis Brandeis, and Learned Hand, were all
people with experience, confidence, and a distinctive writing style.136 What we see in Washington State’s Stephen
Chadwick is a judge who had precisely those qualities. In a
sense he was channeling Holmes in his opinions, and probably doing so consciously. Between 1909 and 1919, Justice
Holmes was quoted in 13 Washington Supreme Court opinions.137 Of those, 5 were written by Emmett Parker, a moderate-to-liberal member of the court who was viewed as a
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scholar, and 4 written by Chadwick.138 No one else on the
court referenced Holmes more than once. Holmes also
turns up in public lectures by Chadwick, both while he was
on the court and afterward.139 The fact that so eminent a
jurist as Holmes was speaking openly about his judicial philosophy of deferring to the popular will as expressed
through elected legislators gave a state judge such as Chadwick license to do the same thing. Further, Chadwick shared
with Holmes the self-confidence to depart from classical legal rhetoric and to describe what his court was doing when
it upheld, rather than overturned, emerging legislation that
regulated business and working conditions. State courts are
recognized as laboratories for the development of law, and
during the Progressive Era the Washington Supreme Court
and other state bodies were often “ahead” of a national Supreme Court (a court on which Holmes was frequently in
the minority) that did not fully adjust its judicial ideology
until 1937, when it upheld the Washington Supreme Court’s
decision in a case involving a law guaranteeing a minimum
wage for women.140
Stephen J. Chadwick’s judicial opinions vividly illustrate
how judges adjust legal doctrines and their notions about
the judiciary’s role in response to significant social and political change. The Washington Supreme Court was not the
driver of the legal changes that occurred during the Progressive Era, but neither was it a mere follower. Judges on
that court were active members of the educated middleclass elite who played a leading role in the progressive movement, and those jurists shared the changing values and concerns of others in their social sphere and the community at
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large. In the context of a huge shift in public opinion and a
massive overhaul of Washington’s legislature in 1910 and
1912, justices were able to move with remarkable rapidity to
alter legal doctrines so that the reform program of newly
elected legislators could take effect. Justice Chadwick was
distinguished among his colleagues for his thoughtful and
well-written opinions and for the candor with which he explained the changes the court was engaged in. His statements about how changes in society could drive a judicial
redefinition of rights and duties anticipated Benjamin Cardozo by a decade;141 they were very much a part of the
emerging legal realist approach to law that came to dominate American legal thought by the late 1930s and that
turned Holmes and Cardozo into icons.142 Realism and
transparency of this sort should be seen as positive in a democracy in which we expect common-law judges not only
to courageously safeguard liberties but also to creatively and
flexibly adjust legal doctrines to reflect the needs and values
of the community as a whole.
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